On reading resolution 84, passed at the Tenth Assembly of the Uniting Church in Australia, 17th July 2003,  several theological, ecclesiological and ethical points of reference can be seen.  Each of these impacts on the making of ethical choices as well as the three ethical standards mentioned in 03.84.2.  Ethical decisions based on resolution 84 of the 10th Assembly must also be consistent with the 8th Assembly resolution 97.31, and the 9th Assembly resolution 00.25.00.  Together, these suggest the following principles,

1. that the Church's faith is in the triune God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and 
2. that its work and unity are build upon the person and work of the Lord Jesus Christ [00.25.03 & 84.1(a)];
3. that the Basis of Union defines the authority of Scripture, and there is a range of views on questions of biblical interpretation, Christian faith and practice [00.25.03; 03.84.1(b); and
4. that differing interpretations may be reached with integrity [03.84.2(i)];
5. that on some issues people may come to "mutually exclusive' positions [03.84.2(i);
6. that we are a diverse people, bound together by Christ, and are servants of the living God who love the Uniting Church as part of the one holy catholic and apostolic church [03.84.1(c)]; 
7. that membership of the Uniting Church is open to all persons subject only to the guidance of the Basis of Union, the Constitution, the Regulations and the policies of the Assembly [03.84.2(iv);
8. that the Church calls its members to live together in peace as a people of faith, notwithstanding differing views in the matter of same sex relationships [03.84.2];.
9. sexuality is God's good gift that brings both joys and responsibilities [97.31.05; 97.31.07];
10. there is no place in sexual ethics for judgmental attitudes [97.31.06];
11. that the Church witnesses to the renewing grace of God in all areas of human activity [97.31.06];
12. that all practices of sexuality that are exploitative and demeaning are unacceptable and contradict God's purposes for us [97.31.07]];
13. that there is a diversity of human relationships in which Uniting Church members are involved and that there are different biblical, theological and cultural responses of groups within the Church to these relationships; [87.2; 97.31.08; & 00.25.03]
14. that discussion of contentious issues may occur, and
15. that these are to be guided by the Church's policy on vilification and harassment [03.84.4(b)]
16. that  the sexual orientation of a candidate is not and has not been in itself a bar to ordination (ASC 82:12)
17. that decision on the suitability of a candidate may depend among other things on the manner in which his or her sexuality is expressed." [ASC 82.12]
18.  that all baptised Christians belong in Christ’s church and are to be welcomed at his table, regardless of their sexual orientation’; [97.31.15(e); 87.1]
19. that  the standards of "celibacy in singleness and faithfulness in marriage" (cisafim) are not policy statements of the Assembly but presbyteries may choose to take it into account as a faithful Christian standard for Christian sexual ethics [03.84.2(ii); 87.4(c)]
20. that the standard of "right relationship" is not a policy statement of the Assembly but presbyteries may choose to take it into account as a faithful Christian standard for Christian sexual ethics [03.84.2(iii)]

Considering ethics based on Divine Command

1. through faith in God's revelation in Scripture; and
2. through reasoning from natural experience to what is fitting to the nature and ultimate end or purpose of human beings.²

What aspects of Natural Law are applicable? 

Natural Law is built upon the following assumptions or perceptions. 

1. that the world is a created, rational order, with values and purposes built into its very nature.  Thus ethical decision based on " rightness" or "duty" (the deontic principle) is seen as an aspect of "virtue" or "excellence" (the aretaic principle).

2. that we can perceive God's plan in the "natural" world.

 2.1.  This understanding derives from the notion that reason perceives reason;  ie. the God-given faculty of reason within humans beings enables them to see the divine reason from which it comes. 

 2.2.  The implications are that moral judgements are dictates of reason and are open to believers and non-believers, alike.

This view derives from Aristotle's view of "ends" (telov", telos), that nature manifests reason, as purpose and value, as the "end" for which a thing functions. Moral judgements are "natural" and right when things serve their "end" or function.  When they do not or cannot, things have gone wrong and are "unnatural". From these assumptions, Natural Law is seen as both describing things as they are and as they ought to be.  Application of Natural Law to human situations, at best, stands subject to agreement regarding the view of human beings identified and the perceived "end" to which they function, before moral decisions that are constructed on those views are accepted.  This is made difficult today, where differences in social anthropology as understood between diverse groups of people, raise issues concerning what nature exhibits. There is great, human diversity in experience, custom and understanding, may be making it "more difficult today to maintain that these differences are simply due to distortions caused by error, sin or bad custom."⁵

To follow Aquinas means that one seeks to derive human moral ends from human natural tendencies.  That is to say, one argues moral precepts from non moral accounts of what humans are like, in order to state what they ought to be like.  That argument from Natural Law follows what G. E. Moore has called the naturalistic fallacy, in which observation of "what is" is argued to present the case for "what ought to be".  A case in point would be to argue from the observation of genitalia, in sexual reproduction (basic biology) to determine all judgments about sexuality.  More's argument is persuasive: value cannot be understood in empirical terms.⁶   Consequently, arguments from Natural law are seen as being radically flawed.⁷Also, reasoning from "what is" to "what ought be" is troublesome logically, as David Hume pointed out, for what is the case and what ought to be the case are two logically different categories, and no conclusion about one follows from the other.⁸  It seems that very spurious ethics, indeed, are on based on Natural Law. 

To the extent that Natural Law conflates facts and values, disagreements regarding specific views of human nature are likely to be as controversial as the moral decisions based upon them.⁹   The case of intimate relationships and marriage is an example, in which disagreements arise, based on certain premises concerning human sexuality.   By restricting understanding of human sexuality to procreational function, relational and affective functions are overlooked or suppressed to a secondary status.  The result is that sexual intercourse is interpreted in terms of procreational function, only, and other forms of human intimacy or partnership recognition are suppressed.  Aquinas' view of Natural Law rescued human sexuality from the Augustinian captivity of fornication as sin, by declaring sexual intercourse as "natural" and free of sin in itself (S.T. XIV, 26-30).  To this view Aquinas conjoined other values, such as concern for the properly ordered emission of semen, preservation of continuation of the species and the following of specific biblical rules (S.T. XIV, 26-30).  The function of emission of semen is seen as having procreation as its end.  However, sexual function was placed within a re-statement of the Alexandrian rule, that the proper function of sexual intercourse is to place semen in the vagina with the view to procreation.. 

This may be so, at a simple, biological level of comprehension.  However, it is far too simplistic a view, in the context of human sexuality and relationships.  The emission of semen in human beings takes place in a relational complex, that involves emotional and affective factors.  These, too, may be seen as essential for human well being, besides and apart from procreation.  Procreation itself takes place within the context of a life time, during which a person is not always seeking to procreate or able to procreate.  Emotional and affective factors are always present during a person’s life time, within a hierarchy of essential needs that involves relational and affective needs.  Cultural context also influences emotional and affective factors, where what is seen as appropriate, condoned or "natural" in one culture may not necessarily be so in another.  An ethic of sexual relationships based on procreation is a restrictive view that ignores or submerges affective human needs and cultural variation. Such a reductionist view of human sexuality creates problems concerning birth control, masturbation, oral-sex, anal sex, sex after menopause, same-sex relationships and sex among couples who know that one member is sterile - being precisely those human aspects of sexuality that do not result in procreation.  Yet each of those aspects is visible in the human population and can be shown to be "natural" or contributing to the common good, in exactly the same manner that procreation has been viewed. 

That procreation relates to the common good, in today's overcrowded and ecologically stressed world, is now a questionable notion.  There are ecological and economic factors to consider, as well, in regard to poverty, birth control and beneficence.  Arguments can be presented, for each of the non-procreative aspects of sexuality listed above, in terms of contribution to the common good.  Thus Natural Law falls short of adequately addressing relational values of human sexuality.

In his more optimistic Age, Aquinas did consider the beneficence of Marriage, in so far as it sought to safe-guard security of procreation, child raising, education and support for each other in old age, as long as both partners survived to give mutual support.  Thus, Marriage can be directed towards the common good.  However, to view all intimate, human relationships as being met comprehensively or exclusively in Marriage, is false, for it argues a general case (human intimate relationships) from a specific example (heterosexual marriage).  It fails to consider relationships other than heterosexual ones.  As Aquinas argues, the general does not always hold up under examination of the specific.

With regard to homosexuality, same-sex acts can be understood as being "natural" for some persons and, from a psychological view, it is not a disordered state.¹⁰   The consideration of sexual orientation, from a psychological view, for example, was not considered by Aquinas, as such understanding was not available to him.  His view of sexuality was culturally determined and, while being historically significant, cannot speak for all time and for all cultures.  In each of Aquinas' examples, he reads his view of function into the object, as specific conclusions.  And while he showed that sin did not rest with the body, his reductionist, natural theology leads to restricted and stereotypic views of sexuality, including practices within heterosexual marriage.  The strengths of his views are in the concern for procreation, nurture, education and societal good.  However, his views are simplistic and inadequate for addressing all concerns of marriage and intimate, human relationships.

Christian regard for the dignity, well-being and worth of all persons, especially of the oppressed and victims of prejudice, has made the quality of relational values significant criteria in examining ethics relating to sexuality.  Modern considerations have moved significantly beyond a concern for procreation and marriage.¹¹   It is in the quality of human relationships, in terms of respect, mutuality, reciprocity, care, and love, that significant, ethical criteria are found and not in procreation.  As Beach says, "the ethical line is drawn between the spiritual difference between a covenanted relationship of mutual love and a loveless or exploitive relationship."¹²    Covenanted relationships of mutual love are equally plausible and moral for all persons, regardless of gender identity or sexuality.  However, this view itself has cultural and historical determinants.

Biblical interpretation

There are two further considerations here with respect to the Bible as a source for Christian ethics:

1. how does one interpret what the Bible says with regard to human nature?
2. how does one apply biblical Law?

Judgments in exegesis are made in terms of choices about relevancy, both as application in context and to context.  Choices are made with respect to theology and how biblical theologies are understood to apply to ethics.  For example, do they give direction as instructions, that are "useful for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness" (2 Tim. 3:16); or are they ideals, rules or principles?  An example of the latter, with full messianic authority, is found in the words of Jesus in Matthew, "You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be children of your Father in heaven;" (Matthew 5:43-45a).  It is well to consider how teachings and theologies have undergone development and change?  What are the overarching patterns?  What are the judgments made about philosophical principles, the understandings of human nature, or the will of God?  Are they immutable?  What is the nature of the Bible and its message?  Are biblical ethics Christian ethics?  The choices in judgment are many and varied.¹³

The Scriptural canon is also diverse, with the Wisdom traditions being unorthodox when compared to the views of the Torah and the Prophets.   For example, the themes of ancestor stories, salvation history, exodus, the Sinai experience, the giving of the law, and covenant theology are not found in Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes.  There is a tension between Wisdom and other aspects of Scripture and, in places, the former acts to redeem or correct the latter; an example being the way in which the Song of Songs may be seen to redeem the "love gone awry" theme of the Fall.¹⁴    Through the erotic voice of the female, equality between lovers is emphasised and women appear to be the main creators of the poetry of eroticism, in contrast to the patriarchial, male voice of the Torah.  Play, flirtation, erotic passion and searching for love enhance the creation of sexuality.  Procreation is not the final word.

for love is strong as death, 
passion fierce as the grave. 
Its flashes are flashes of fire, 
a raging flame.
Many waters cannot quench love, 
neither can floods drown it. 
If one offered for love all the wealth of his house, 
it would be utterly scorned.
(Song of Songs 8:6b-7)

What is bent cannot be made straight,
and what is lacking cannot be counted.

Consider the work of God; 
For who can make straight 
what he has made bent? (Ecc. 1:15; 7:13)

The beginning of wisdom is this: Get wisdom, and whatever else you get, get insight. (Prov. 4:7)

REFERENCES
 1.  John Macquarrie and James Childress (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, s.v. "Medieval Ethics".
 2.  Ibid.
 3.  James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy. pp.46-50.
 4.  Ibid. p.50.
 5.  Robin  Gill, Christian Ethics, p.86.  Also see John Macquarrie and James Childress (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics,  s.v. "teleological ethics".
 6.  E. J. Bond, Ethics and Human Well-Being, pp.103-104.
 7.  John Macquarrie and James Childress (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, s.v. "Natural law".  Also E. J. Bond, op cit., pp.103-105; and R. Gill, op cit, p. 87, contains a reference to the view that natural tendencies accord with the will of God as Creator and therefore a category error is not involved.  Gill says that reasoning this way, is not clear.
 8.  Ibid. p.52.  Also Robin  Gill, op cit., p.86.  Both argue a conflation of description with prescription as a category error.
 9.  Ibid.
10. Waldo Beach, Christian Ethics. p.62.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. See John Macquarrie and James Childress (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics,  s.v. "Christian Ethics", "Bible in Christian Ethics", "teleological ethics",  .
14  Trible, Phyllis, God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality. (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1978.)  p. 144.